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the danger that federal taxes will “crowd-out” state revenues justifies 
aggressive judicial limits on the conditions attached to federal spending. 
Economic theory offers a number of reasons to believe the opposite: federal 
revenue increases may also buoy state finances. To test these competing 
claims, I examine for the first time the relationship between total federal 
revenues and state revenues. I find that, contra the NFIB v. Sebelius 
plurality, increases in federal revenue—controlling, of course, for 
economic performance and other factors—are associated with a large and 
statistically significant increase in state revenues. This version of the study 
provides extensive background explanations of underlying economic 
concepts for readers unfamiliar with the prior public finance literature. 
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[H]eavy federal taxation diminishes the practical ability of States to 
collect their own taxes.† 
INTRODUCTION 
NFIB v. Sebelius—the health care case—upheld most of the 
Affordable Care Act, but allowed states to “opt out” of certain aspects of 
the law’s changes to the Medicaid program.1 As early commentators have 
noted, the Medicaid portions of the decision rewrote seventy-seven years of 
precedent, altered one of the fundamental legal rules underlying the modern 
state, and, oh by the way, may also affect access to health care for 
millions.2 What other writers have not yet observed is that all of those 
outcomes depend logically on a single factual claim, made explicitly by 
four “dissenters” and relied upon implicitly by the three Justices who 
joined the “majority” opinion. The Court’s entire analysis of that fact is set 
out in the quotation just above this paragraph. My goal here is to give a 
more serious examination, including both theoretical and original empirical 
analysis, of whether federal taxation affects states’ “practical ability . . . to 
collect their own taxes.”3 
First, a little more background. Medicaid is an exercise of the federal 
power of conditional spending.4 Congress can “lay and collect Taxes . . . 
to . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare,” and can impose conditions on 
 
† Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 n.13 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
1 Id. at 2608 (Roberts, J.). 
2 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013); Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid 
and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2, 5–7 
(2013). 
3 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662, n.13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
4 Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004). 
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the receipt of those funds.5 Between 1935 and late June of 2012, that power 
faced few meaningful restrictions.6 Starting in the 1990s, though, the Court 
held that Congress was prohibited from “commandeering” state officials.7 
Effectively, the federal government could regulate state officials qua state 
officials only if states were willing to accept money in exchange. In NFIB, 
however, Justice Roberts’s opinion declared that federal threats to revoke 
Medicaid funds in some settings could so “coerce” states that the states had 
no “real” choice but to comply, rendering Medicaid the practical equivalent 
of commandeering.8 Two Justices joined in that portion of the decision, 
while four other Justices, who described themselves as “dissenters,” 
basically agreed with that outcome, although they did not formally join 
Roberts’s opinion.9 
What does health care have to do with state taxes? Consider Justice 
Roberts’s claim that the threat of Medicaid revocation was a “gun to the 
head” of states.10 Colorful, but states do not have heads. What they do have 
is budgets. A closer analogy might be the college student told by her 
parents, “No more beer or no tuition.” Many students would start to skip 
the keg parties. But Mark Zuckerberg could laugh and drink up. Financial 
pressure, in other words, depends on the need for and availability of other 
sources of revenue.11 As the NFIB dissenters apparently recognized, 
Medicaid’s large contribution to state budgets does not itself make an 
intuitive case for coercion; for states to really be pinched by budget threats, 
it must also be the case that the lost funds could not readily be replaced. 
The dissenters filled this logical gap by arguing that states cannot 
afford to replace Medicaid.12 Their claim, again, is that federal taxes make 
it tougher for states to raise revenues. Although the dissenters offered no 
further analysis, there have also been several academic proponents of this 
“crowd-out” theory, most prominently the federalism scholar Lynn Baker.13 
 
5 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
6 Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 2–3. 
7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 
(1992). 
8 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (Roberts, J.). 
9 Id. at 2575, 2608; id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 2604 (Roberts, J.). 
11 See Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 
1137, 1208 (1997). 
12 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
13 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1935–47 
(1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Spending]; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH 
THE STATE 150–57 (1993); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: 
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 107; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, 
Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever 
Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 430–31 (1998) (“Assuming . . . 
that the states cannot generally afford to forego federal highway funds, [conditional spending] works 
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While Baker’s explanation is the most developed, even she offers little 
examination of crowd-out beyond the intuition that voters who are already 
taxed might not appreciate more taxes.14 
The public finance economics literature, while not confronting the 
crowd-out question directly, offers both theory and some evidence that 
shed light on it. As economists recognize, though, the theoretical arguments 
are ambiguous.15 For example, on the one hand federal taxes can make state 
taxation more difficult by shrinking the tax “base” for each state; federal 
taxes on boats probably mean that there will be fewer boat sales for states 
to tax. But at the same time, by allowing state taxpayers to deduct state 
taxes paid from federal income, the federal tax code effectively offers 
states a matching grant to impose their own taxes, and this grant grows 
more generous as the federal income tax rate rises.16 Thus, theory predicts 
that federal taxes might actually lead to crowd-in, not crowd-out.17 
Prior empirical work has attempted to determine how the dueling 
theories play out in reality, but the existing studies are too narrow to 
resolve the crowd-out debate. One set of papers looks at whether changes 
in the rates of one form of federal tax affect the rate of tax imposed on the 
same base by lower levels of government—for instance, whether federal 
gasoline excises increase or reduce state gas tax rates.18 But even if these 
 
just as effectively to commandeer the state legislative process as did [commandeering].”); Thomas R. 
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 
86; Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 958 (1985). Notably, the doctrinal 
line that Justice Roberts ultimately adopts tracks closely Professor Baker’s 1995 proposal, although 
there were also other, earlier suggestions similar to Baker’s. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 
(Roberts, J.) (appearing to test for coercion by looking at whether a federal grant withholds unrelated 
funds), with Baker, Conditional Spending, supra, at 1973–74 (proposing same), and Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1260–62 (1977) (concluding that same was the 
likely implication of then-recent Supreme Court decisions). 
14 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936–38. 
15 M.P. Devereux et al., Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some 
Evidence from the USA, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 451, 458–60 (2007); Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Leonzio 
Rizzo, (Uncontrolled) Aggregate Shocks or Vertical Tax Interdependence? Evidence from Gasoline and 
Cigarettes, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 353, 354 (2011). 
16 Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The 
Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 ECON. PERSP. 37, 55 (1987); see I.R.C. § 164 (2012). 
17 See Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, Tax Incentives in Fiscal Federalism: An 
Integrated Perspective, 43 CAN. J. ECON. 683, 684 (2010) (“Horizontal and vertical fiscal ties upwardly 
distort local tax rate choices.”). 
18 Linda Andersson et al., Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 243, 
245, 255–56 (2004); Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Vertical Externalities in Tax Setting: 
Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 383, 389–95 (1998); Marius Brülhart & 
Mario Jametti, Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Externalities: An Empirical Test, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 2027, 
2048 (2006); Howard Chernick & Jennifer Tennant, Federal–State Tax Interactions in the United States 
and Canada, 40 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 508, 519–27 (2010); Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 461–
79; Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal 
Income Taxation in Canada, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 235, 236, 249 (2002) [hereinafter Esteller-Moré 
108:989 (2014) Does Federal Spending “Coerce” States? 
993 
papers agreed that federal taxes change state tax rates—they do not19—they 
still would not tell us whether states actually lose money, or whether they 
are able to make up lost revenues elsewhere. Can states get back their lost 
gas taxes through cigarette taxes? The studies do not tell us. 
Another set of papers examines the impact of the federal deduction for 
state and local taxes paid on state budgets.20 Those findings, too, are largely 
inconsistent with one another.21 Even if they were in agreement, there are 
other factors that can contribute to crowd-in or mitigate crowd-out. 
I therefore present here the first examination of the total effect of 
federal revenues on state revenue raising. Using a panel of state and federal 
budget data from 1998 to 2010, I estimate the effects of federal revenues on 
total state own-source revenues per capita22 and state own-source revenues 
as a share of state GDP. In most specifications, I find considerable 
evidence of crowd-in: federal revenues increase both state revenues and 
state revenue as a fraction of available state wealth. Given the limitations of 
these kinds of data, my findings do not prove that crowd-out is impossible 
or that crowd-out did not exist in other periods. But they do suggest that 
claims that federal spending coerces contemporary states may rest on a 
mistaken factual premise. 
My main purposes here are threefold. Most importantly, I want to 
contribute the first piece of really useful evidence about an important fact 
underlying a key constitutional controversy. I also want to introduce the 
existing public finance economics theory on that controversy to the legal 
community. Readers already familiar with fundamentals of economic 
theory may therefore find my theoretical discussion longer than it needs to 
be, but on the assumption that such readers can skim I err on the side of 
explaining more rather than less. 
 
& Solé-Ollé, Canada]; Álex Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, Vertical Income Tax Externalities and 
Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 247, 254–70 (2001) 
[hereinafter Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, US]; Per G. Fredriksson & Khawaja A. Mamun, Vertical 
Externalities in Cigarette Taxation: Do Tax Revenues Go Up in Smoke?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 35, 35–48 
(2007). 
19 For a survey, see Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 512–15. 
20 Id. at 515–18; Paul N. Courant & Edward M. Gramlich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 on State and Local Fiscal Behavior, in DO TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 1986, at 243, 244–63 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal 
Deductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. ECON. 269, 270 (1990); Edward M. Gramlich, 
The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 447, 453–58 (1985); Gilbert E. Metcalf, 
Assessing the Federal Deduction for State and Local Tax Payments, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 576–88 
(2011); see also Bruce Bartlett, The Case for Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 
28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122–23 (1985) (surveying earlier studies). 
21 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515; Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the 
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 487 & 
n.206 (1996). 
22 That is, revenues other than money received from the federal government. 
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Finally, I believe that my empirical results are independently 
interesting for the economic literature, whatever the implications for legal 
rules. The relationship between national revenues and subnational revenue 
capacity is also potentially critical for fiscal federalism theory. For 
example, some have argued that in a federation, new government projects 
create negative fiscal externalities for other tiers of government—in other 
words, that taxes at one level tend to crowd out taxes for others—and that 
this implies that federalism leads to governments that are excessively 
bloated.23 But in the presence of crowding-in, where fiscal externalities are 
positive, the implication is that federalism actually leads to governments 
that are too small. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains in more 
detail the legal reasoning that puts the crowd-out question at the center of 
Spending Clause analysis. Part II explores the economic and political 
theory of the relationship between federal and state revenues, focusing on 
arguments that might lead us to expect crowd-out. Part III collects some 
arguments that predict the opposite. Part IV summarizes the so-far-
inconclusive evidence. And Part V then describes my original empirical 
evidence, including my findings that in recent years federal revenues have 
tended to increase state proceeds. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Conditional federal spending is a centerpiece of the modern regulatory 
architecture of the United States.24 With the exception of Medicare, nearly 
every big-ticket item on the federal government’s domestic spending 
budget goes to support a joint venture with the states. Unemployment 
insurance, aid to the poor, education standards and incentives, clean air and 
water, health care for the indigent and those with disabilities, and legal 
protections against state-sponsored discrimination: all are designed as a set 
of conditions on federal grants to states.25 
The legal underpinnings of these structures were stable for about 
seventy-five years. In 1937, the Supreme Court turned back challenges to 
the newly enacted Social Security and Unemployment Insurance systems.26 
The plaintiffs had urged the Court to throw out unemployment insurance 
because of its novel structure: it channeled reams of federal dollars to 
states, in exchange for their agreement to tax their own employers and to 
 
23 See Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High 
Taxes?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 363 (2002); Russell S. Sobel, Optimal Taxation in a Federal System 
of Governments, 64 S. ECON. J. 468, 469–73 (1997). 
24 For an overview, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–73 (2001). 
25 See Brief for David Satcher et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8–11, Florida ex 
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400). 
26 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574–78, 598 (1937). 
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administer claims by unemployed workers.27 This structure, the plaintiff 
employers argued, was “coerci[ve],” because it forced states into the 
service of the national government.28 The Court, in a famous passage by 
Justice Cardozo, refused to countenance that claim, arguing that the 
concept of coercion was difficult to fathom when applied to states, and that 
any effort to define coercion in that context would “plunge the law in 
endless difficulties.”29 
Not much happened on the coercion front for the next sixty years. As a 
formal matter, Cardozo’s opinion had held out the possibility that some 
future statute might be found coercive, but given the rationale for his 
decision—that coercion as a concept was not judicially manageable—it 
was hard to see how any such claim could succeed.30 And, indeed, from 
1936 until 2012, no court found that a federal statute had coerced state 
grant recipients.31 
In the background, though, some important details were developing. 
Twice in the 1990s, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government 
could not “commandeer” nonjudicial state officials.32 That is, Congress 
could not enact a law directing state officials to act—could not, for 
instance, order state officials to conduct background checks before issuing 
firearm permits.33 But the Court also was careful to distinguish 
commandeering from conditional spending; Congress could still offer 
money to the states subject to conditions.34 As long as states were legally 
free to reject the terms of the offer, it was not commandeering.35 
The Court’s reasons for its distinction between commands and 
conditions were never clearly formulated. The only real explanation from 
the bench was that commandeering obscured public accountability: voters 
might wrongly blame state officials for following their federal orders.36 As 
commentators observed, one could say much the same about conditional 
spending and other forms of cooperative federalism.37 The most likely 
 
27 Id. at 585–87. 
28 Id. at 578. 
29 Id. at 589–90. 
30 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (suggesting theoretical possibility that 
federal spending could coerce states, but finding no coercion on the facts then before the Court). 
31 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 372 
(2008); Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
32 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
33 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 923; New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (holding that a law requiring states to 
either take title to nuclear waste or regulate it in line with federal standards impermissibly 
commandeered state governments). 
34 New York, 505 U.S. at 166–67, 171–74. 
35 Id. at 174. 
36 Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–30; New York, 505 U.S. at 168–69, 182–83. 
37 Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL 
VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
996 
distinction, some argued, was that when voters blamed their local officials 
for the outcomes that flowed from a federal grant, those voters were not 
wrong: whereas commandeered officials had no part in the outcome, state 
officials “deserved” blame at least for agreeing to the grant.38 
Other commentators also suggested that the two scenarios could be 
distinguished by an “internalization” principle.39 Under conditional 
spending, the federal government at least had to pay a price for its policies, 
while commandeering allowed Congress to pass the costs of enforcement 
on to the states.40 By forcing Congress to pay, commandeering indirectly 
limited federal power, because Congress would have to raise taxes to pay 
for its policies.41 
Fast-forward to 2012. As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
Congress had enacted an expansion of the Medicaid program.42 To simplify 
considerably, the ACA required that states receiving Medicaid money 
expand the pool of persons eligible for Medicaid assistance, and provided 
for enhanced subsidies to cover the cost of these “newly eligible 
individuals.”43 A number of states then challenged the expansion as 
unconstitutionally coercive.44 
 
UNION 213, 231 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 826–28 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits 
of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2200–05 (1998). 
38 Even this story breaks down if one considers that state officials can also be blamed for their 
failure to lobby effectively in warding off “commandeering” enactments. Brian Galle, Getting 
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of 
Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 201 & nn.273, 275 (2004); see Neil S. Seigel, Commandeering 
and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1662–63 (2006) (noting that 
voters would have been correct in assuming that state officials were involved in the decision to transfer 
title of nuclear waste in New York). 
39 D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—the Alternative to 
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 644–45 (1985); Seigel, supra note 38, at 
1644–45. 
40 See Seigel, supra note 38, at 1644–45. 
41 See id.; see also Galle, supra note 38, at 167–70 (arguing that conditional spending is 
distinguishable from the other enumerated powers on this basis). 
42 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 153 
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)). Medicaid is a cooperative 
enterprise in which states provide payment for medical care for low-income and disabled households, 
supported by federal matching grants ranging from 50% to 83%, and subject to a long set of federal 
rules and requirements. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 3, 5 
(2013), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf; KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID 
& THE UNINSURED, A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF HOW STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY 
OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012). States may escape the conditions by forfeiting 
the money. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
43 Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 25–30. 
44 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 
(N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Most readers surely know what happened next. The Court, in a divided 
decision, ruled that conditioning funds already provided under preexisting 
Medicaid rules on states’ acceptance of the Medicaid expansion indeed was 
coercive.45 Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, then went 
on to state that the Medicaid expansion could go forward, but that the only 
permissible sanction for states that refused would be the loss of the “new” 
Medicaid spending authorized in the ACA.46 Two other Justices, Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor, would have upheld the ACA in its entirety, yielding five 
votes for upholding at least some portion of the Medicaid expansion.47 The 
other four Justices agreed with Roberts that the Medicaid expansion was 
coercive, but would have gone further and thrown out the entire statute.48 
Other commentators have already begun ably to attempt to unpack the 
tangle of arguments in Justice Roberts’s opinion,49 so I want to focus here 
on the key analogy between federal grants and commandeering. Roberts 
argues that “[t]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority 
to require the States to regulate”50 and that that principle “is true whether 
Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a 
State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.”51 Given that federal 
Medicaid matching grants provide an average of ten percent of states’ 
budgets, Roberts writes, states have “no real option but to acquiesce.”52 
Though I agree with Professor Bagenstos that Roberts’s opinion also 
appears to set out some additional requirements for a conditional grant to 
be unconstitutional,53 this equivalence between grants and commandeering 
looks to be at least necessary to, if not sufficient for, a finding of 
unconstitutionality. 
As I suggested at the outset, this equivalence is a puzzle. Let us set 
aside, for the sake of argument, the large number of conceptual questions 
one could raise about the claim that states, or perhaps state legislatures, can 
be coerced.54 Let us pretend instead, as the NFIB opinions seem to, that 
states are like humans, who can be menaced with guns, and for whom our 
moral intuitions about concepts such as free will might have some 
meaning. Even in that context, threats to impose money penalties are not 
 
45 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (Roberts, J.). 
46 Id. at 2607. 
47 Id. at 2629–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
48 Id. at 2656–68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
49 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 866–71, 873–906; Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 37–76. 
50 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, J.) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 
(1992)). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 2604–05. 
53 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 873–902. 
54 See Bagenstos, supra note 31, at 372–80; Baker & Berman, supra note 13, at 521 (suggesting 
that the concept of coercion has too many problems to be judicially manageable). 
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typically seen as “coercion,” because we recognize that humans do have 
free will and are capable of deciding their own priorities.55 When Verizon 
demands a $200 termination fee for my switch to AT&T, I will pay it if I 
like AT&T’s 4G coverage better. Put another way, states that refuse a grant 
always have the legal authority to raise taxes or cut spending.56 What can 
Roberts mean when he writes that the states have no “real” option? 
One argument, if an implausible one, is politics. Maybe the claim is 
simply that it is politically difficult to raise taxes.57 And, given the power of 
entrenched interest groups, it may also sometimes be challenging to cut 
spending,58 although most states in the recent recession had no such 
difficulty.59 But what does “politically difficult” mean? Only that state 
officials have something—reelection—that they value more than they value 
refusing the grant. That again sounds like a choice. Perhaps there is a 
constitutional argument that state officials should never have to make tough 
political decisions, but if so it is not clear what the content of that argument 
could be.60 Further, as I have suggested elsewhere, there are good reasons 
to believe state officials often will have self-serving incentives to refuse 
grants,61 a point that is well illustrated by the fact that many Republican 
governors are now threatening to refuse the Medicaid expansion.62 
 
55 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419–21 
(1989). Having said that, even some noncoercive threats, such as blackmail, are sometimes off limits 
legally. But the Court’s argument here is not that Medicaid was a threat, but that it was a coercive 
threat. 
56 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2561 (2005); see U.S. 
CONST. art IV (guaranteeing states a republican form of government). 
57 E.g., Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 15, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400). 
58 This is also the core intuition behind the claim that states are “locked in” to federal grants: local 
constituencies grow around grant programs, like coral, reducing state officials’ political flexibility. 
David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of 
the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1243–44 (2004); 
see Hills, supra note 37, at 903–04. My view is that state political influence over agencies that 
implement cooperative programs generally mitigates any lock-in concerns. Galle, supra note 38, at 
191–96. 
59 See Monica Davey, Budget Worries Push Governors to Same Mind-Set, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2011, at A1; Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At Least 
46 States Have Imposed Cuts that Hurt Vulnerable Residents and Cause Job Loss, CENTER ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–2 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf. 
60 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 880 (arguing that political consequences for state officials who 
turn down grants is part of the political accountability that the Court aims to protect). 
61 Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 900–19 (2008). 
62 Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2012, at A17; Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States over Medicaid 
Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at A1. 
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Poverty is a better argument.63 Assume for the sake of discussion that 
state governments provide absolutely vital services (however those are 
defined) to their citizens, and are struggling on the brink of solvency.64 In 
that situation, it at least becomes more tenable to claim that state officials 
have no real option but to accept assistance; by assumption, without federal 
dollars, states will lose something essential to their mission.65 That is the 
scenario where it makes sense to suggest that conditional spending might 
cause voters to assign blame to the wrong official, and in which it might be 
possible for the federal government to foist off regulatory responsibility on 
states without paying the full price.66 
The four dissenters in NFIB appear to have made this leap. Like 
Roberts, they argue that coercive federal spending is equivalent to 
commandeering.67 Their explanation for why the Medicaid expansion is 
coercive is more detailed, though. They note that states “would be very 
hard pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other 
spending or raising additional revenue.”68 And, though they acknowledge 
that states have sovereign control over taxing and spending,69 they argue 
that the reason states would be unable to replace lost Medicaid dollars is 
that “heavy federal taxation” has reduced the states’ ability to raise money 
for themselves.70 In effect, the claim is that federal taxes have crowded out 
state taxes to such an extent that states have only a tenuous ability to raise 
additional funds.71 While small federal grants might be replaceable, a grant 
as large as Medicaid, in combination with the crowding effect of federal 
taxation, makes refusal impractical. 
 
63 Cf. Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1938 (comparing states receiving grants to 
welfare recipients who would starve without assistance); Baker & Berman, supra note 13, at 519–20 
(comparing states to a “destitute widow”). 
64 For evidence on whether U.S. states have found themselves in this position in recent times, see 
Galle, supra note 61, at 923–30 (short answer: no). 
65 I would like to avoid getting too bogged down in philosophical debate over what “coercion” 
means. But note here briefly how much intellectual work the word “real” is doing in Roberts’s opinion. 
States always legally have choices, but some of those choices have consequences so undesirable that we 
would rather not see them put to that choice. The “real” option is one that avoids painful moral 
consequences or consequences inconsistent with the presumed constitutional structure. Which 
consequences those are remains a matter of moral and constitutional judgment, all of which is elided in 
the Roberts opinion. It is in this sense, as Professor Sullivan pointed out long ago, that all definitions of 
coercion are “irreducibly normative.” Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1428. 
66 Galle, supra note 61, at 919–22; Seigel, supra note 39, at 1656 n.110. 
67 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659–60 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 2663. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 2662 n.13. 
71 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 871 (noting the dissenters’ link between crowd-out and 
coercion). The dissenters do not explain why spending cuts are off the table as another alternative. 
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Academic commentators, too, rely on the crowd-out argument to 
explain why states cannot turn to their own revenues.72 For example, 
Professor Baker argues that “[w]hen the federal government makes a 
conditional offer of funds, states [that dislike the conditions] are severely 
constrained in their decisionmaking by the lack of equivalent, alternative 
sources of revenue.”73 She acknowledges that states have their own taxing 
authority, but claims that the federal government has a “monopoly power” 
over revenues that prevents states from being able to draw on their own 
funds.74 
In short, all of the coercion arguments appear to rely, either explicitly 
or implicitly, on the factual claim that federal taxation squeezes state 
revenue capacity.75 To be sure, there are a number of other questionable 
assumptions built into the coercion argument,76 and perhaps other ways one 
might justify limits on conditional spending.77 But those questions aside, 
the crowd-out claim looks to be essential to any persuasive case for the 
doctrinal course the Justices have chosen. And while it is uncertain exactly 
how future courts will assemble the three NFIB opinions into a “holding,”78 
it seems likely that no matter how that plays out, the explicit views of four 
Justices, and the logically necessary claims of three others, will be central 
to future applications. 
 
72 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936–38; Seigel, supra note 39, at 1656–57. 
73 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936. 
74 Id. at 1936–38. 
75 That is not to say that NFIB or academic commentators have clearly explained what the crowd-
out concept means. Suppose that federal revenues do not absolutely prevent state taxes but merely 
increase the economic cost or political pain of collecting them. At what point are the cost and pain so 
unacceptable that they are “coercive”? See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 879 (raising this question). What 
kinds of state services would have to be threatened by revenue shortfalls for spending cuts, too, to be 
coercive? Who decides the baseline of what are essential state services? And, since the entire artifice 
rests on claims about voter confusion, when do voters assign “too much” blame to state officials? Given 
that there are always plausible arguments for why state officials may have had some role in a concurrent 
program, cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1265–84, 1297 (2009) (noting that codependency gives state officials power to sway outcomes, 
and suggesting that this should reduce judicial concerns over commandeering), the voter-confusion 
story necessarily implies that there must be some underlying normative theory of the “right” amount of 
blame. 
76 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2640–42 & nn. 24–26 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part); Huberfeld et 
al., supra note 2, at 42–46. 
77 E.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 118 (2004) (arguing that because state officials do 
not internalize the effect of their acts on the whole nation, state decisions to accept grants can diminish 
national welfare); Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1492–96 (arguing that, while conditional grants are not 
“coercive” in the usual sense, they may still allow the federal government to obtain more power than 
the constitutional system prescribes). 
78 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 866–68 & n.24. 
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My goal for the remainder of this Article is therefore to try to better 
understand what crowd-out means, and to explore whether observable facts 
support the Justices’ assumption that it happens in the real world. 
II. ECONOMIC & POLITICAL THEORIES OF CROWD-OUT 
The claim that the federal tax “monopoly” will reduce state taxes 
seems to depend on an unstated assumption that the state and federal 
governments are wrestling for control of a single resource. But barring a 
communist revolution, taxation inevitably leaves a large portion of social 
wealth in private hands.79 In that setting, as I will show, the intuition that 
crowd-out rhetoric invokes misses important details. Economic theory does 
offer some reasons to believe crowd-out is a possibility. But it also 
provides lots of very good reasons for why federal revenues could actually 
increase state receipts, especially given existing U.S. institutions. Similarly, 
a political analysis of two sovereigns sharing one common pool of funding 
could predict either crowd-out or crowd-in, depending on institutions and 
quirks of human behavior. In this Part, I begin to tease out the competing 
narratives. 
Let us start with the simple arithmetic argument. If the federal 
government takes all the money, states cannot raise money themselves. If 
national revenues were one dollar short of the gross domestic product, there 
would not be much room for state government. But in a more realistic 
setting, when federal revenues rise, state voters have a choice between 
surrendering some private consumption and cutting state taxes. A 
persuasive case for crowd-out must explain why voters would necessarily 
choose to keep private goods over public goods. I see two basic routes to 
that case, one legal and economic, the other largely political. 
A. Law & Economics of Crowd-Out 
Let me first explain why I say that the crowd-out argument necessarily 
assumes a hidden premise that the two sovereigns are tugging at one shared 
resource. In the U.S. context there may be more than one resource: federal 
and state taxes need not overlap. The Constitution requires that any federal 
“direct” tax be apportioned.80 Apportionment means that the revenue raised 
from the tax must be divided among the states according to their 
population; the exact mechanism is tedious, and is set forth in the margin 
for readers who have trouble sleeping.81 Although the U.S. did impose 
 
79 And even the revolution may leave space for black markets and elites with Swiss bank accounts. 
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
81 In essence, each state pays a fraction of the total national tax equal to its share of the national 
population. Suppose the federal government aims to collect $100m in special land taxes. If California 
has ten percent of the U.S. population, it would have to pay ten percent of the total federal revenues for 
an apportioned tax, or $10m. If there is only one taxpayer in California whose land meets the criteria of 
the tax, that person will pay $10m. 
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some apportioned direct taxes in the nineteenth century, it is generally 
agreed now that in a modern setting apportionment produces such absurdly 
unequal burdens on taxpayers in different states that the federal 
government can no longer practically collect direct taxes.82 This means that 
there are some things that only states can tax. While the exact definition of 
direct taxes remains a little uncertain, they likely at least comprise taxes on 
land and “head,” or uniform per-person, taxes.83 
If each source of tax revenue were its own pot of money, then these 
constitutional limits on federal taxation would rather weaken the crowd-out 
argument. The federal government might exact a high income tax, but 
states could respond simply by shifting to real estate and head taxes. 
Similarly, at present the national government has very few sales taxes, with 
excises on gas and cigarettes as the major exceptions.84 States can currently 
respond to higher federal income taxes simply by collecting more in sales 
tax. 
The economic reality is a bit more complicated. The “incidence,” or 
real economic bite, of a tax does not always match its legal label.85 For 
instance, suppose that the reason I go to work is in order to buy myself 
shiny things. What if there were a tax on retail purchases? Then the pile of 
shiny things I can get by pulling on pants and working is smaller. I might 
well prefer to stay in bed. For this reason, most economists believe that part 
of the incidence of consumption taxes, which can include the retail sales 
tax as well as other taxes on goods and services, falls on labor.86 That is, it 
affects our decision to work, as well as what to buy. Similarly, if there is a 
tax on real estate, I might prefer to invest in something else. Because there 
is now demand for that something else, its price rises, meaning I cannot 
purchase as much of it. Thus, some theorists think that taxes on land in 
effect are taxes on all capital investments.87 
 
82 Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the 
Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 841 (2009). 
83 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (Roberts, J.); Springer v. 
United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (summarizing the prior one hundred years of doctrine); Dodge, 
supra note 82, at 864–75. 
84 BRIAN FRANCIS, FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES, INCLUDING THE SLOW DEATH OF EXPIRED TAXES 
(1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98excise.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 20: 
FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES REPORTED TO OR COLLECTED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, AND CUSTOMS SERVICE, BY TYPE OF EXCISE TAX, 
FISCAL YEARS 1999–2012 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-
20. 
85 See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 557–85 (3d ed. 2011). 
86 E.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model, 
71 AM. ECON. REV. 533, 538 (1981). 
87 For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature, see Peter Mieszkowski & George R. 
Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, 
and Property Taxes, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1098, 1110–17, 1127–31 (1989). 
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Viewed in this way the crowd-out argument quickly becomes an 
empirical one. To what extent do taxes nominally imposed on one base 
spill over onto others? Would federal taxes on capital earnings interfere 
with state taxes on land? Theory cannot provide an answer; the outcome 
depends on how humans respond to changes in the price of different 
commodities—the elasticity of demand and supply.88 And elasticities could 
change over time as the population’s preferences change. 
Even if it were clear that the “indirect” taxes permitted to the federal 
government could effectively burden the sources of the “direct” taxes 
reserved for states, crowd-out theory still must explain how this overlap 
impacts states’ finances. When taxes at one level rise, do voters prefer to 
give up government services or their private consumption? Or perhaps the 
tradeoff is not zero-sum at all. We need a theory of how public funds are 
allocated to make a good prediction. 
One standard prediction in the public finance literature is that 
overlapping taxation by two sovereigns may reduce the total funds 
available to either because of the deadweight loss of taxation.89 Taxes can 
change our behavior, as many a wealthy Cayman Islands banker could 
attest.90 Sometimes these changes create costs without any offsetting 
benefits. For instance, to take advantage of the low tax rates Ireland 
imposes on intellectual property, Microsoft, Apple, and many other firms 
have set up a series of shell corporations in which profits appear to be 
earned in Ireland rather than, say, the United States.91 Imagine what your 
iPad could do if Apple had spent the time and intellectual effort it devoted 
to these tax dodges on refining its product instead. These wasted efforts are 
known as deadweight loss.92 
The deadweight loss generated by one sovereign’s taxes can impact 
another sovereign dependent on the same sources of revenue.93 If the 
economy is less vibrant because people and businesses are wasting 
resources avoiding federal taxation, then state personal and corporate 
income taxes will bring in less revenue. That can be the case even if neither 
government’s tax formally overlaps with the other’s. Federal corporate 
 
88 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 564–71. 
89 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386–87. 
90 See JAMES S. HENRY, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED 27–36 
(2012), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.
pdf (estimating that over $10 trillion in global wealth is hidden in “offshore” financial institutions); 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 727–50 (2011) (describing tax-
reducing possibilities of the U.S. regime for taxation of international business). 
91 Kleinbard, supra note 90, at 706–13; Lee Sheppard, How Does Apple Avoid Taxes?, FORBES 
(May 28, 2013, 7:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard/2013/05/28/how-does-apple-avoid-
taxes/. 
92 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 591–601. 
93 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386–87. 
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taxes could potentially reduce state income tax revenues just by distorting 
the economy, albeit fairly indirectly. 
Economists believe these effects are usually compounded, though, 
when both sovereigns are taxing the same things.94 The math underlying the 
theory of deadweight loss predicts that losses grow exponentially with the 
marginal tax rate.95 That is, the losses from a tax of 10% are more than 
double the losses from a tax of 5%.96 If two sovereigns tax the same base, 
each may find that their tax is far more economically costly than they 
expected because of the interaction between the two taxes. For instance, 
suppose the federal government taxes widgets at 10% and that the state of 
Widgetdoom is considering adding its own 10% tax. If consumers consider 
these taxes together when they make their purchase decision, in effect the 
consumer is looking at a 20% higher price. The standard theory of 
deadweight losses predicts that the impact of the new Widgetdoom tax on 
the local economy will be considerably larger than if the state imposed an 
identical tax with no federal excise. It may therefore no longer be 
economically prudent for the state to impose the tax. 
It is worth noting that this point, too, rests on some uncertainties. Here 
again the elasticity of private responses matters.97 If demand for a good is 
highly inelastic—if people do not change their desire for it much when its 
price changes—then the deadweight loss of overlapping taxes will be 
small.98 The overlap theory also assumes that individuals will respond to 
two different taxes as though they were part of one price. But that is not 
necessarily the case. As anyone who has watched an infomercial knows, 
and as ample academic research now confirms, consumers do not always 
treat different parts of the price of a good, such as shipping and handling 
charges, the same as others.99 Some lab research suggests that individuals 
might similarly fail to integrate the effects of separate tax systems.100 
 
94 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515–16. 
95 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 594–95. 
96 Without dwelling on the math, the intuition is that small changes in price only affect people who 
are relatively indifferent to how their decision turns out. GRUBER, supra note 85, at 595. But as the 
price effect gets larger, we start to pull in people who feel more and more strongly about the outcome. 
97 See Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515 (explaining that the “displacement effect” of 
federal tax depends on elasticity of the tax base). 
98 See Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 452, 458 (arguing that vertical tax effects are small when 
demand is inelastic); Keen & Kotsogiannis, supra note 23, at 366–67 (modeling the claim that the effect 
of federalism on state taxation depends on elasticity of investors’ responsiveness to tax). 
99 Vicki G. Morwitz et al., Divide and Prosper: Consumers’ Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J. 
MARKETING RES. 453, 453–63 (1998); see Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of 
Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 101–18 (2002). 
100 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
106, 107 (2006) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Thinking]; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, 
The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1765–68 (2005); Edward J. 
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of 
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Another well-known interaction between two tax systems also arises 
from the fact that taxes change people’s behavior. Suppose the government 
taxes apples but not pears. Depending on how readily people switch from 
one of these to another—the “cross-elasticity” of demand—this differential 
taxation might mean more pear eaters.101 A federal apple tax then could 
reduce state apple-tax revenues, because there would be fewer apple sales 
for the state to tax.102 That is, substitutions in response to federal tax not 
only shrink the state’s economy, but also shrink the fraction of the state’s 
economy subject to tax. The state might raise its rates or tax some other 
commodity instead, but if the state tax system had already been optimized 
to minimize the total economic burden of taxation, those shifts would again 
increase the deadweight loss of state taxation. 
An important caveat to the deadweight loss arguments is that existing 
state systems are rarely ideal and may well have many available “margins” 
on which to adjust their behavior.103 For instance, rather than raising their 
nominal tax rates in response to federal taxation, states could phase out 
some inefficient subsidy, creating an effective tax on the subsidy 
recipients.104 By inserting many of these small phase-outs, the state could 
keep all of its tax rates low, avoiding the exponential effects of higher 
effective taxes. 
Another, less familiar argument the crowd-out theorist could offer is 
that overlapping tax bases reduce the revenue-maximizing rate available to 
both sovereigns.105 Tax rate increases beyond a certain point may reduce 
revenues by motivating taxpayers to go to greater efforts to avoid the tax.106 
For example, in the United States many states rely primarily on the federal  
 
 
Tax Systems, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 231–32 (2003). For a more 
comprehensive overview, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 72 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 73–77 (2009). 
101 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, 
in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023–37 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1987). 
102 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386. 
103 Cf. id. at 387 (noting that states can reduce expenditures rather than raising taxes). 
104 In my prior work I explain why states are especially prone to giving away highly inefficient 
subsidy payments. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of 
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 840–44 (2012). 
105 See Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Intra-jurisdictional Tax Competition, 16 CONST. POL. 
ECON. 387, 388–89 (2005). 
106 See JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX BY DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 28–31 (2011); 
Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical 
Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 6–18 (2012). For evidence, see Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The 
Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 6–26 (2002); Wojciech 
Kopczuk, Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2093 (2005); 
and Emmanuel Saez, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel Study of “Bracket Creep,” 
87 J. PUB. ECON. 1231 (2003). 
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definition of income for purposes of their own income tax.107 Suppose Ted 
Taxpayer has to decide how to report his business income. His reporting 
decision will affect both his federal and state income taxes. When Ted 
decides how risky or aggressive his reporting position should be, he 
rationally should compute the total marginal cost of each dollar of income 
his position will cost him.108 Increases in one government’s tax rate could 
therefore shrink the tax base for the other, even aside from pure deadweight 
losses. 
Notice again the empirical uncertainty that lies behind the revenue-
maximization argument. Rate changes by overlapping governments affect 
their rivals only to the extent that the total combined rate is high enough to 
motivate these kinds of base-affecting decisions. For that to happen, there 
must be some shared legal definitions of the tax base. And, again, it must 
be the case that taxpayers are rational in the sense that they combine the 
two pieces of the tax price together when they make their decisions.109 
In short, there is an economic case for crowd-out but it is an uncertain 
one. While state and federal governments do not necessarily tax the same 
sources, it is possible that the decisions of one can affect the other. Whether 
these effects are large, small, or nonexistent depends on conditions on the 
ground that cannot easily be predicted in the abstract. And there are still a 
number of countervailing possibilities I have not yet considered. 
B. The Politics of Crowd-Out 
Like the economic case for crowd-out, the political argument, as it has 
currently been articulated by scholars, depends on a series of assumptions. 
For example, Lynn Baker and others have argued that federal taxation 
crowds out states’ revenue-raising ability because the tax-paying public has 
a limited tolerance for taxation.110 But these claims presume that voters 
consider state and federal taxation to be substitutes for each other, that state 
voters have no way of communicating their preference for lower total tax to 
federal officials, and that voters’ “utility functions” are stable and 
 
107 Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1020 (2011). 
108 Cf. Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 453 (suggesting that total excise taxes may affect 
incentives for tax avoidance). 
109 As far as I am aware, there is no clear evidence on whether taxpayers respond to combined 
federal–state prices as though they were one price. The nearest study is Gruber and Saez, who find no 
statistically significant differences in the responses of taxpayers to state and federal tax rates. Gruber & 
Saez, supra note 106, at 22–23. If taxpayers do not integrate the two prices, we arguably should see less 
responsiveness to state taxes. But then the magnitude of the state rate changes that Gruber and Saez 
studied were mostly much smaller than the magnitude of the federal changes, see id. at 13–15 & n.7, 
making it hard to know if their results offered a relevant comparison. 
110 See supra note 13. 
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additive.111 Again, these assumptions may be defensible, but they need 
some unpacking. 
First, it is a bit of a puzzle why federal taxes would make voters want 
fewer state taxes. I may speak only for myself on this point, but having a 
new television does not lessen my desire for hot dogs. That is, purchasing 
one set of goods—for instance, the bundle of government services one gets 
from the federal government in exchange for taxes—should not have any 
direct effects on a voter’s preferences for another set of distinct goods, such 
as the bundle of services they receive from their state or local 
governments.112 To be sure, if voters think of all government as one 
indistinguishable mass of “public goods,” then it is likely one might 
displace the other.113 As the economist Sam Peltzman showed in 1973, 
public spending for one specific good is likely to reduce our desire to 
purchase (whether from a charity or a second government) another very 
similar good.114 
We thus seem to have yet another empirical question about how public 
preferences work. Do voters see different tiers of government as 
interchangeable, such that getting more of one makes us want less of the 
other? Or are the two governments two very different bags of groceries? 
Looking at the data in the modern United States, government services 
at the national and subnational levels are fairly highly differentiated. Both 
tiers spend a good deal on health with most state spending via the Medicaid 
program.115 But that aside, the bulk of national spending is defense, 
retirement, and income security, which primarily consist of various transfer 
 
111 A “utility function” is a model of how an individual’s decisions affect her subjective well-being. 
GRUBER, supra note 85, at 26. 
112 Cf. Joel Huber & Christopher Puto, Market Boundaries and Product Choice: Illustrating 
Attraction and Substitution Effects, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 31, 34, 40 (1983) (observing that consumers 
sometimes change their purchase decisions based on availability of an “irrelevant” alternative, and 
describing this behavior as irrational); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Product Assortment on Buyer 
Preferences, 75 J. RETAILING 347, 348–70 (1999) (same, surveying the marketing literature). The 
exception would be if two goods are “complements” or “substitutes” for each other. Simonson, supra, 
at 354–55. Chocolate and peanut butter are the tastiest example of the former. 
113 This appears to be the standard assumption in many existing economic analyses of crowding. 
See, e.g., Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 245 (noting that the authors follow several other papers in 
assuming voters have preferences between only three different goods: labor supply, public goods, and 
private goods). 
114 Sam Peltzman, The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case 
of Higher Education, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1, 5 (1973). Similarly, one could argue that some voters could 
have preferences for the overall size of government or otherwise somehow specifically resent taxes in a 
way that they do not resent other goods. But that is a just-so story; there is no ex ante reason to expect 
that voters will certainly accept or reject that view. 
115 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES TABLES tbl.3 
(2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf. 
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payments.116 Education dominates nonhealth state government spending. 
Education and Medicaid combined currently make up two-thirds of state 
budgets; transportation is a distant third at less than 8%.117 This split is not 
new and probably not a coincidence; basic fiscal federalism theory predicts 
that national defense and redistribution should be national functions.118 
Voters may be rationally ignorant, but such dramatic, persistent differences 
seem difficult to overlook. So while it is certainly not inconceivable that 
voters view the two governments as interchangeable, it would be 
surprising. 
Another well-known way that federal taxes could affect voter demand 
for unrelated state taxes is through what is known as the income effect.119 
Sometimes having more money changes our preferences for stuff: not 
many millionaires ride the bus. For most things, which economists 
logically enough call “normal” goods, demand increases with income.120 
There is evidence that many state services are normal goods, although 
some theorists differ.121 In any event, the argument would be that federal 
taxes, by reducing the wealth of state voters, diminish their demand for 
government services. 
But this neglects federal spending. Some states take in more federal 
total dollars than their citizens pay in taxes, suggesting that demand for 
state taxes should actually increase in those states.122 At the individual 
level, recent estimates suggest that the median American voter receives a 
net benefit from federal taxing and spending.123 Wealthier voters are net 
 
116 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT tbl.3.2, at 74 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf. 
117 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 
2009–2011 STATE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20
State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf. 
118 See GRUBER, supra note 85, at 274; Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the 
Poor in a Federal System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987). 
119 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515–16. 
120 GRUBER, supra note 85, at G-7. 
121 Daniel Hewitt, Demand for National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 
487, 503 (1985). But see BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 69–70 (1977). 
122 See Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending Received by State, 1981–2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 
19, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-taxes-paid-vs-federal-spending-received-state-1981-
2005; Cary M. Atlas et al., Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, 
and Why, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 624, 626–28 (1995). I assume for the purposes of argument here that 
income effects resulting from transfers of funds to a general population in fact alter political outcomes 
in the same way they alter preferences. In fact, I think that is unclear, but further explication will have 
to await later work. 
123 See The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2008 and 2009, Supplemental 
Table 7, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43373; Greg Mankiw, 
The Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (July 14, 2012), 
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2012/07/progressivity-of-taxes-and-transfers.html (noting that CBO’s 
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payors by the definition of the estimators.124 Even assuming that voters 
perceive the value of government benefits in the same way the study 
authors did,125 the net income effect is unclear: wealthy voters are 
politically more potent but of course fewer in number. That is usually a 
prescription for the victory of the minority,126 but on occasion policy 
entrepreneurs can awaken the sleeping giant and the majority prevails.127 
Once again, theory does not give us a clear prediction. 
A second assumption the political story relies on is that, even if federal 
taxes and state taxes are substitutes, it is state taxes that are the loser in any 
political conflict. Rick Hills has made this point, but it is worth elaborating 
just a bit.128 As Hills argues, voters could well prefer state to federal 
services, and so any overlap may tend to reduce the size of the national 
government rather than states.129 A counterargument could be that the 
federal government is a kind of “Stackelberg leader,” a game-theoretic term 
for a player whose dominant market position gives it a first-mover 
advantage.130 If Congress sees itself as a single entity in competition with 
states, perhaps it could, like a monopolist pushing around tiny competitors, 
use its economies of scale in national revenue raising to keep states from 
claiming too much of its tax “market.” 
This counter raises a host of additional questions. Recent observers of 
Congress may note that shared purpose is not exactly a hallmark of the 
institution. Party allegiances and partisan advantage play important roles 
and, as advocates of the “political safeguards of federalism” have pointed 
 
figures imply that the median voter is a net recipient of federal transfers, but cautioning that data may 
change with complete inclusion of state figures). 
124 Mankiw, supra note 123. 
125 For example, some wealthy voters may view transfer payments to others as a social good 
they’ve purchased with their taxes. Others may see any provision of public goods with their own money 
as a “common disaster” they would have preferred to avoid. 
126 See Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 
of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 705–06 (2007) (arguing that standard public choice theory predicts 
that overlapping tax bases will increase political pressure to cut taxes). 
127 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations for 
Environmental Laws, 1969–73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49–56 (1998). For an empirical 
examination of how federal distributions to states are determined, see Gary A. Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 
The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level, 123 PUB. CHOICE 95, 103–10 
(2005). 
128 Hills, supra note 37, at 865. 
129 Id. For additional arguments along these lines, see Galle, supra note 126, at 707–08. For 
evidence that subnational taxes affect federal tax choices, albeit in a Canadian setting, see Masayoshi 
Hayashi & Robin Boadway, An Empirical Analysis of Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of 
Business Income Taxes in Canada, 34 CANADIAN J. ECON. 481, 501–02 (2001). 
130 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 385 (modeling the U.S. government as a Stackelberg 
leader); Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Efficiency and the Optimal Direction of Federal–State 
Transfers, 3 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 137, 138 (1996) (same). 
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out, may serve as levers for states to preserve their own interests.131 
Congress’s collective fiscal interests are also a public good for the 
members of Congress, meaning that if an interest group can offer an 
individual member private rewards for protecting the group’s desires, the 
member has strong incentives to favor the group over the interests of 
Congress as a whole.132 Members of Congress may therefore be more 
attached to state constituencies who are devoted to lowering federal taxes 
than they are to their own budget authority. 
Put another way, the crowd-out argument appears to assume that 
federal political actors will not internalize the impact of federal budgets on 
state finances.133 But in fact state-level actors have a wide variety of tools 
for ensuring that federal officials do just that. Whether they utilize those 
tools is a different question, and may depend on the political structure of 
the federal enactment. As Mark Seidenfeld and I have argued in a related 
context, federal enactments with low partisan valence and thin impacts 
across many states might lead to free riding, while politically charged 
changes, or threats to a major interest group or a small cluster of states, 
would be more likely to trigger intense opposition.134 But admittedly these 
are broad theoretical predictions of the average outcome, not guarantees 
that states will win or lose any given fight. 
A final source of uncertainty lies in the third assumption I mentioned, 
the assumption that state voters’ preferences for policy outcomes really 
respond to simple math in the way that the political crowd-out story seems 
to require. As I mentioned earlier, there are good reasons to suspect that 
voters actually do not jointly consider the total burden of taxation imposed 
by separate governments: they “anchor” on the larger number, or they keep 
separate mental accounts of the two tax burdens, or state tax burdens are 
simply less salient overall.135 A long tradition of conservative economic 
thought maintains that federated government, by breaking up and 
 
131 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278–86 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Franita Tolson, Benign 
Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 416–27 (2012). 
132 For empirical evidence of this phenomenon, see Brian Galle, The Politics of Federalism: Self-
interest or Safeguards? Evidence from Congressional Control of State Taxation, in HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1759510. 
133 Cf. Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 387 (noting that their model assumes the federal tax setter 
does not account for state revenue effects); Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, Canada, supra note 18, at 249–
52 (noting that the federal government can use grants to undo any distortions caused by crowd-out). 
134 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, 
and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1964–66 (2008). 
135 McCafferey & Baron, Thinking, supra note 100, at 122–23, 132; Edward J. McCaffery & 
Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING 289, 290–91 (2006). For more detailed discussion, see Brian Galle, Federal 
Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. 805, 815–18 (2008). 
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shrouding the total size of government, allows for a higher total tax than 
unitary government would, although evidence of that proposition remains 
elusive.136 
Voter preferences may also be contingent, rather than “exogenous” or 
determined independent of the existing political and legal rules. Suppose 
that federal revenues cause crowd-out under one set of legal arrangements, 
but would not cause crowd-out under another. In that case, should the 
federal government be prohibited from imposing conditions on its 
spending, or instead should the legal rules that cause crowd-out give way? 
To take one example, if the U.S. had more generous “revenue sharing” 
along the lines of the Canadian model, many poorer states would have 
greater resources.137 In those states it would presumably be easier for 
taxpayers to absorb the economic strain of increased state revenue 
demands.138 Alternately, crowd-out of state revenues would very likely 
diminish sharply if all state taxes were fully creditable against federal 
taxation. If we only observe crowd-out in the absence of revenue sharing, 
should the logic of coercion demand fewer conditions on federal grants, or 
instead more generous federal support for states? 
Similarly, the states’ existing laws may determine voter preferences. If 
states could readily borrow, upward shocks in fiscal demand could be 
smoothed out over time, diminishing the impact at least of temporary 
changes in federal taxation.139 But it is states’ own budgeting rules that 
impair their borrowing capacity.140 Those rules are a defensible response to 
 
136 Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J. 
ECON. SURVS. 261, 264–65, 270–71, 293–94 (1996); Keen & Kotsogiannis, supra note 23, at 364–65, 
369. 
137 See Richard M. Bird & Michael Smart, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International 
Lessons for Developing Countries, 30 WORLD DEV. 899, 900–07 (2002) (describing the basic goals and 
outcomes of revenue sharing); Robin Boadway, Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of 
Fiscal Decentralization, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 93, 112–16 (2001) (explaining the role of equalization 
grants in a decentralized system). 
138 Kelders & Koethenbuerger, supra note 17, at 684–85, 690 (claiming that revenue sharing 
reduces fiscal pressure). 
139 See Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51 NAT’L 
TAX J. 715, 717–19 (1998) (describing the relationship between state borrowing and state ability to 
weather fiscal crises). Borrowing diminishes the impact of revenue shocks for a number of reasons. 
Perhaps the most straightforward is the relation between deadweight loss and tax rates. Robert J. Barro, 
On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 J. POL. ECON. 940, 943–45 (1979). For a state that starts at 
a 10% tax, ten years of 11% taxes are much less distortive than one year of 20% taxes. See id. 
Additionally, there are good reasons to think that as a political matter present voters and officials will 
view the burden of debts as less than the burden of an equivalent present discounted value of tax 
increases. For an extended discussion of that point, see Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and 
the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 187, 199–200 (2010). 
140 Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State 
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915–16 (2003); Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Fiscal 
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predictable political failures at the state level.141 But again they pose the 
question: if crowd-out is contingent on the presence of these state rules, 
why should the legal burden of coercion fall on conditional spending, 
rather than the rules that contribute to crowd-out? 
Lastly on this point, federal anticoercion laws may themselves cause 
crowd-out. States have several possible tools for preparing for unexpected 
fiscal demands. Borrowing, again, is one of these, and so is saving.142 But if 
the Supreme Court guarantees that states will not be subjected to sharp new 
financial demands from the federal government, the state has less reason to 
build those kinds of revenue-smoothing institutions. In essence, the 
coercion doctrine is a bailout, a promise of assistance in the event of fiscal 
emergencies.143 In that scenario, crowd-out is the result of moral hazard: the 
state fails to take action to protect itself against fiscal shocks because it has 
judicially provided insurance against the shock.144 
Overall, the political argument for crowd-out is uncertain. While some 
of the uncertainties are relatively deep conceptual questions about the 
nature of voter preferences, others are straightforward questions about how 
voters and political officials behave. Those questions, at least, are testable, 
as I hope to show shortly. 
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CROWD-IN 
Despite all the possible arguments I have just set out, the reported 
conventional wisdom among state budget analysts is that state revenues 
tend to rise together with federal revenues.145 That is, federal revenues 
might actually crowd-in state revenues. Why might that be? One set of 
potential reasons involves the close relationship between state taxing 
systems and the federal income tax. Another relates to the way that voters 
may form preferences about the size and cost of government. 
First, though, it may be useful to sort out a definitional issue. In one 
sense it should be completely unsurprising that state and federal revenues 
tend to have a strong positive correlation, because both are usually imposed 
 
Institutions in U.S. States, in INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND FISCAL POLICY 167, 169–70 & tbl.1 (Rolf R. 
Strauch & Jürgen von Hagen eds., 2000); Levinson, supra note 139, at 717. 
141 Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 198–204. 
142 Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State 
Fiscal Crises During the 1990–1991 Recession, 16 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1996, at 28, 28–29. 
143 For accessible explanations of the dynamics of “bailouts,” see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of 
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 491–508 (2011), and Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for 
a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1358–70 (2011). 
144 See Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior: 
Insurance Versus Aggregate Discipline, 62 J. INT’L ECON. 149, 153–54 (2004) (noting that federal 
guarantees can induce fiscal recklessness by local governments). 
145 C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 34–36 (2d ed. 2008); Alysoun 
McLaughlin, National Conference of State Legislatures, The Impact of Federal Tax Policy Decisions on 
States’ Budgets (2003) (“As a rule, when federal taxes go up or down, so do state taxes.”). 
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on sources of funds that vary with the strength of the economy.146 When the 
economy is booming, income and sales tax revenues often are too.147 
Because property values are stickier, and assessed property values stickier 
still, property taxes are less variable, but are still somewhat sensitive to 
economic conditions.148 So perhaps this is all that analysts mean when they 
say that government revenues move together: most governments’ revenues 
are affected by economic conditions. 
The crowd-in I have in mind is something different. For either crowd-
out or crowd-in, it seems the key question is whether federal policies make 
it more or less difficult for the state to raise money, all else equal. To 
observe whether causation exists in this way, arguably the better measure 
of crowding would therefore hold economic conditions constant, as would 
be the case if we measured the effects of federal tax on state revenues as a 
percentage of the state’s wealth, or “gross domestic product.” On the other 
hand, I have already suggested some ways in which tax’s effects on the 
economy can itself contribute to crowd-out (and, as I will show in a 
moment, crowd-in). So maybe the most precise measure of crowding 
would be to hold all non-tax-related changes in the economy constant. 
Unfortunately, it rarely will be possible to cleanly separate out the tax-
related changes in economic conditions from those that arose 
independently, which will complicate my econometric analysis.149 For now, 
my only point is that when I refer to crowd-in, I am describing those effects 
that are most closely related to the federal tax system. 
Another possibility the budget analysts may have in mind, and that 
would not be much relevant for my inquiry, is that what looks like crowd-
in may instead be changes in voter demand for government. Voters might 
simultaneously agree to higher taxes for both their state and federal 
governments because they decide they want more of some service that both 
governments provide.150 Health care would be the major contemporary 
example here.151 But this simultaneous change in demand does not really 
tell us much about crowding theory, since that would be a mere correlation, 
while the question crowd-out theorists seem to have in mind is whether 
federal taxation actually causes states’ diminished ability to tax. 
 
146 Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases 
over the Business Cycle, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 535, 543 tbl.2 (1996). 
147 See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 419–23 (2010). 
148 Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and 
Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413, 450–52 (2012). 
149 Further, since in some sense all economic conditions in a democracy depend on the existence of 
government, a separation between tax-related and other kinds of economic changes may not offer a 
clear conceptual boundary. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES 
AND JUSTICE 32–37 (2002). 
150 Cf. Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 395 (identifying factors that might cause simultaneous 
changes in federal and state tax rates). 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 115–18. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1014 
Turning to crowd-in itself, then, many economists have hypothesized 
that the interrelated structures of state and federal tax systems tie together 
the paths of federal and state revenues. A key component of that 
relationship is the federal income tax deduction for taxes paid to state and 
local governments.152 Federal taxpayers who itemize can reduce their 
federal taxable income by the amount of income and property taxes they 
paid to other governments.153 Currently, itemizers also have the option of 
swapping their state income tax deduction for a deduction for the amount 
of general sales tax they pay, a handy choice for residents of states like 
Texas and Florida that lack an income tax.154 
Crucially for the crowd-in argument, the dollar value of a deduction 
increases when federal income tax rates rise.155 Deductions reduce taxable 
income, not taxes due. So each dollar of deduction reduces the size of the 
check the taxpayer must write to the government by her marginal tax rate 
times the amount of the deduction.156 In effect, the federal government is 
offering a matching grant to its taxpayers for the purchase of state and local 
government.157 When federal rates go up, the value of the matching grant 
increases.158 Furthermore, to the extent that households view federal taxes 
paid as lost income, a deduction makes them feel subjectively richer. If 
state government is a normal good, this income effect, too, should increase 
their demand for state services.159 For some taxpayers, though—mostly 
homeowners or large families whose incomes fall between $100,000 and 
$500,000—the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) will claw back the value 
of the state and local deduction.160 
 
152 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 510–11. 
153 I.R.C. § 164 (2012). “Itemizing” means that the taxpayer has chosen to claim a bundle of 
individual tax benefits, rather than the “standard” deduction. JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 32 (16th ed. 2012). In 2014, the standard deduction for a single filer is $6200, Rev. 
Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 541, meaning that taxpayers should choose to itemize if their bundle of 
benefits adds up to more than that. 
154 Sales tax deductibility was repealed in 1986, but reinstated in its current optional form in 2004. 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 501, 118 Stat. 1418, 1520–21 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5) (2012)). 
155 See Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 511 (noting relation between value of deductibility 
and income). 
156 For instance, when Theresa Taxpayer takes a $10,000 deduction, the amount she saves on her 
tax bill depends on her marginal rate. If she earns $1 million per year, putting her in the highest bracket, 
she will have a 39.6% marginal rate, meaning the deduction will save her $3960. 
157 McLure & Zodrow, supra note 16. 
158 Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic 
Stabilizers, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 37. 
159 See Stephen J. Bailey & Stephen Connolly, The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further 
Research, 95 PUB. CHOICE 335, 336 (1998) (explaining separate income and substitution effects of 
matching grants). 
160 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). For more details on the relation between the AMT and 
§ 164, see Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 210–17. 
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A similar provision is the federal tax exemption for income earned on 
bonds issued by state and local governments.161 Because interest is tax free 
for holders of the bonds, states can offer a below-market rate of interest and 
still be competitive with taxable bond issuers.162 Again, the size of this 
discount increases with the federal income tax rate, since that rate 
represents the amount of money exempt-bond purchasers save relative to 
buying a taxable bond. As a result, state taxpayers face a lower overall 
price of government.163 The highest income bondholders may also be net 
enriched by the combination of tax exemption and lower bond rates,164 
leading to an income effect that could drive up demand for government 
services.165 Even if tax-exempt bonds do not lead to crowd-in, they should 
mitigate the impact of unexpected federal demands on state revenues by 
lowering borrowing costs, allowing the state to spread out the burden over 
time.166 
Crowd-in may also be a product of overlapping legal definitions and 
enforcement.167 Most states define income as based in significant part on 
the federal definition.168 Thus, when Congress expands its tax base, state 
bases expand as well.169 As I and others have explained before, while 
sharing definitions does cede some policy primacy to the federal 
government, it also greatly simplifies life for state taxpayers, and allows 
state enforcement efforts to piggyback on the federal government and other 
 
161 § 103. 
162 Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1030, 1042 (1983). For more details on the bond program, see Shanske, supra note 148, at 434–
45. 
163 See Gillette, supra note 162, at 1046–47 (noting that tax-exempt bonds are equivalent to federal 
grants to borrowers). 
164 See Robert P. Huefner, Municipal Bonds: The Costs and Benefits of an Alternative, 23 NAT’L 
TAX J. 407, 409 (1970) (explaining that exempt bond buyers receive a windfall if their tax rate is above 
the rate of the marginal purchaser). Top tax bracket bondholders sometimes come out ahead by buying 
exempt bonds because the price of the bond may be set to compete for the business of buyers in a lower 
bracket. For instance, let’s say the market rate for bonds issued by nonexempts with credit comparable 
to the State of Indebtedness would be 10%. The State initially offers its bonds at 6.5%, assuming that 
this price will leave buyers in the 35% bracket indifferent between their product and a competitor. What 
if it does not manage to sell all its bonds? It may then raise its rates to 7% to capture the business of 
buyers in the 30% bracket. Buyers whose marginal rate is 35% then reap a 0.5% windfall. 
165 See Gillette, supra note 162, at 1052–54 (noting income effect of exemption generally). 
166 Cf. Barro, supra note 139, at 942–45 (suggesting that borrowing allows governments to 
overcome temporary drops in revenue or increases in demand more efficiently). 
167 See Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, Canada, supra note 18, at 241, 253; Helen F. Ladd, State 
Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New Test of the Flypaper Effect, 12 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 82, 82 (1993). 
168 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 510. 
169 Ruth Mason, Delegating up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267, 
1269 (2013). 
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states.170 For example, relative to individual state revenue agencies, the IRS 
has massive economies of scale, and, with its web of state- and 
international-data sharing, access to a more complete picture of each 
taxpayer’s economic life.171 More effective enforcement not only saves 
states money but also likely reduces the elasticity of taxable income—that 
is, diminishes taxpayers’ incentives to take aggressive reporting positions, 
increasing the amount of revenue states can collect at any given tax rate. 
The benefits of shared enforcement are not necessarily static, and may 
well rise as the federal tax rate rises. In theory, it would be rational for the 
federal government to anticipate that its own tax increases would 
incentivize more creative tax accounting.172 Federal officials should 
therefore audit more intensively when rates are higher, or at a minimum 
devote more audit attention to taxpayers in higher brackets.173 The latter, at 
least, fits with the available publicly known facts about IRS practices. 
Another source of crowd-in, then, might be the revenue benefits states 
realize when federal auditors ratchet up their efforts. 
Shared enforcement resources may be especially important in the 
taxation of multijurisdictional taxpayers and cross-border transactions. 
When the tax base for each taxable unit is divided among several 
jurisdictions, the temptation for taxpayers to report their affairs in such a 
way as to allocate a larger share of the base to low-tax sovereigns is 
substantial. Information-sharing regimes can help to overcome this 
problem, but low-tax jurisdictions (sometimes called “tax havens”) have 
incentives to under share.174 A credible central repository of data, such as 
that provided to states by the federal government, may mitigate the ability 
of taxpayers to shift income across borders, and again the information-
checking effort expended by the federal authorities rationally should 
increase with their own tax rate. 
Another set of theoretical arguments for crowd-in rests on predictions 
about how voters form preferences for how much to tax themselves. The 
 
170 Galle, supra note 126, at 702–04; Mason, supra note 169, at 1279–88; Mason, supra note 107, 
at 1020; Kim Rueben & Kirk J. Stark, Federal Tax Reform and the Deduction for State and Local Taxes 
5 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2012/stark. 
pdf. In addition, an automatically expanding base could enlarge state revenues if officials want higher 
taxes and state-level voters are inattentive to the automatic expansions. Research on whether that effect 
in fact occurs has been inconclusive. Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal 
Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATTHEWS 
65, 66–71 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988). 
171 Galle, supra note 126, at 703. 
172 Saez et al., supra note 106. 
173 There are also other alternatives, although mostly unexplored by domestic revenue authorities. 
See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 710–40 (2009). 
174 Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 628–
30, 655–57 (2008). 
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simplest of these I have discussed already: income effects. An expanding 
federal government can enrich many state residents. Some states on net 
receive more federal transfers than they pay in taxes.175 Others, such as 
Maryland and Virginia, may be home to large numbers of federal 
contractors and employees.176 And, notwithstanding the occasional $800 
toilet seat, some federal revenues may actually be used for good 
investments that expand the economy.177 
More subtly, Besley and Case have argued that voters may decide how 
much tax they want based on “yardstick competition”—comparisons 
between governments.178 If my neighbors are paying 10% of their income 
to their state, my own governor’s proposal to hike taxes from 8% to 9% 
seems more reasonable. Although Besley and Case focus on horizontal 
competition among states, other commentators suggest that voters may also 
compare governments vertically.179 While there is little direct evidence of 
vertical yardstick comparison, if it exists it could cause crowd-in: voters 
may be more inclined to see higher state taxes as a good deal when federal 
government is quite expensive. 
Proponents of the so-called “Leviathan” theory of government tell a 
related vertical competition story that focuses instead on the incentives of 
government officials. In these accounts society’s total available resources 
are a common pool from which both federal and state officials must “fish” 
for taxes.180 Leviathan theorists assume that officials have self-interested 
 
175 See sources cited supra note 122. Of course, this would imply crowd-out in net payor states. 
176 See Federal Employees by State, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/federal-
employees-workforce-numbers-by-state.html (last visited June 7, 2014) (approximately 145,000 federal 
jobs in Maryland and 175,000 federal jobs in Virginia). 
177 Cf. Bev Dahlby & Leonard S. Wilson, Vertical Fiscal Externalities in a Federation, 87 J. PUB. 
ECON. 917, 921–27 (2003) (modeling the claim that state taxation can increase federal revenues by 
improving productivity of labor and therefore taxable income). 
178 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick 
Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 41 (1995); Pierre Salmon, Horizontal Competition Among 
Governments, in HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 61, 73–77 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio 
eds., 2006). However, this evidence is not consistently supported across all data. See Timothy Besley & 
Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 7, 50–51 (2003) [hereinafter Besley & Case, Policy Choices]; see also Esteller-Moré & 
Solé-Ollé, Canada, supra note 18, at 253 (finding evidence consistent with horizontal yardstick 
competition in Canada). 
179 E.g., Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich W. Ursprung, Political Yardstick Competition, Economic 
Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation: A Numerical Analysis of a Contest Success 
Function Model, 124 PUB. CHOICE 329, 331 (2005); see also Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 
518 (suggesting that federal tax increases may serve as a “first-mover signal” to states). 
180 Dahlby & Wilson, supra note 177, at 918–19; Michael Keen, Vertical Tax Externalities in the 
Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 454, 459 (1998); see also Brülhart & Jametti, 
supra note 18, at 2028 (suggesting that a common pool problem arises whenever officials maximize 
their own constituency’s welfare); Ingemar Hanson & Charles Stuart, The Suboptimality of Local 
Taxation Under Two-Tier Fiscal Federalism, 3 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 407 (1987) (modeling shared budget 
as a common pool). 
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reasons for wanting to maximize the revenues available for their own use.181 
Given this assumption, and the further assumption that there are limited 
fish in the pond, basic game theory predicts that each competitor should 
want to catch the fish before their rivals get them all.182 If each competitor 
fears that her rival’s efforts will ultimately crowd out her own, competition 
may encourage all the participants to increase their taxing efforts. 
To sum up, there is a strong theoretical case for crowd-in. To my eye 
that case is stronger than the predictions of crowd-out. But both seem 
plausible. Indeed, both sets of predictions may be right, so that there could 
well be strong influences in each direction. We have therefore come to the 
end of what theory can likely tell us. At this point, we need evidence. 
IV. PRIOR EVIDENCE ON CROWDING 
In this Part, I will examine the existing evidence on whether federal 
revenues displace state funds. The evidence is thin, so my summary will be 
brief. In general, although there is no prior research directly on the effects 
of total federal revenues on total state revenues, there are two sets of 
narrower studies on related questions that could be relevant to my question 
here. Taken together, though, these narrower studies are fairly 
inconclusive. 
The first set of studies examines whether federal taxation crowds out 
state taxation of the same tax base. For example, a series of papers has 
studied whether federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline reduce state 
taxes on cigarettes and gasoline, respectively.183 Some find that federal 
taxes increase state tax rates for the same commodity,184 while others find 
no such effect or that the effect varies over time or commodity.185 One 
paper finds crowd-out.186 Other papers focus on the income tax. Again, 
 
181 Keen, supra note 180, at 455. 
182 Christopher Berry, Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common-Pool, 52 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 802, 805–06 (2008). 
183 E.g., Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 451–52; Esteller-Moré & Rizzo, supra note 15, at 359–
76. 
184 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 392. 
185 Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 452, 469; Esteller-Moré & Rizzo, supra note 15, at 355. 
Because the Esteller-Moré and Rizzo study is able to better account for the possible impact of non-tax-
related economic events, and incorporates Devereux et al.’s insight that horizontal and vertical tax 
effects may interact, I find its results more convincing than others. See Esteller-Moré & Rizzo, supra 
note 15, at 356–57. 
186 Fredriksson & Mamun, supra note 18, at 35–36. Fredriksson and Mamun suggest that their 
results differ from others because they add controls for the state-level political influence of smokers and 
tobacco companies. Id. at 36. They also employ a putative measure of state corruption, which they 
measure by the number of federal corruption convictions. Id. For a variety of reasons, that outcome is 
probably a very poor measure of actual corruption. For example, corrupt state officials might well be 
better at warding off convictions when corruption is widespread enough to affect the federal 
prosecutor’s future job prospects in the state. More problematically, the corruption measure could be 
correlated with other factors that would confound their results. To take one example, successful 
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some find evidence of crowd-in,187 while others find the opposite, although 
the latter are all in the international context.188 Chernick and Tennant look 
jointly at income and consumption taxes, finding that although states may 
respond to federal taxation by shifting their tax base to favor wealthier 
voters, these shifts are overall revenue neutral.189 However, it is unclear 
whether Chernick and Tennant consider concurrent changes in other 
sources of revenue, such as corporate taxes and user fees. They also use 
simulated individual burdens rather than real statewide collections, and 
combine state and local effects, while our question here is state-level fiscal 
effects.190 
In interpreting many of these studies it is important to distinguish 
changes in state tax rates from changes in the amount of funds states are 
able to raise from their tax. Again, if federal taxation diminishes a state’s 
tax base—for example, if federal gas taxes motivate Escalade drivers to 
switch to an Escape or a Smart car—then state rates might rise to preserve 
total revenue levels.191 The reverse is also possible; good federal 
investments could expand the state economy and allow for lower rates.192 
Then again, higher rates usually mean more money. So it is ambiguous, 
looking at rates alone, whether state revenues on net are moving in the 
same direction.193 Since the question posed by the NFIB decision is whether 
federal taxes reduce states’ ability to bring in funds, the relevant data point 
is total revenues, not tax rates. Therefore the tax-rate studies, even if they 
were more conclusive than they are, would not actually tell us a great deal 
about the coercion problem. 
 
prosecutions could correlate with greater federal resources devoted to the state, which could in turn 
affect state demand for public goods. It would therefore be interesting to know whether Fredriksson and 
Mamun would reach the same result if they dropped that variable, which they found to have significant 
effects. Id. 
187 Brülhart & Jametti, supra note 18 (Swiss cantons and municipalities); Esteller-Moré & Solé-
Ollé, Canada, supra note 18, at 249 (Canada). 
188 Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 255–56 (Swedish local and municipal governments); 
Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Competition and Tax Structure in Open Federal Economies: Evidence from 
OECD Countries with Implications for the European Union, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 357, 372 (2002); see 
also Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 508 (noting that U.S. studies find crowd-in while studies of 
other jurisdictions sometimes find crowd-out). 
189 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 531. 
190 Id. at 521–22. 
191 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386 (“An increase in federal taxes on goods that are also 
taxed by the state implies that the states have to raise their rates in order to maintain their revenues.”). 
192 Fredriksson and Mamun argue that their tax rate results also imply lower state revenues. 
Fredriksson & Mamun, supra note 18, at 47. But lower rates imply lower revenues only if there are no 
offsetting expansions in the tax base—for example, if more individuals buy tobacco because the tax is 
lower. Fredriksson and Mamun offer no evidence on tax base in either direction. Also, their study does 
not tell us anything about whether states offset any possible loss in tobacco-tax revenues with other 
revenues or spending cuts. 
193 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 516. 
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Studies of the impact of federal deductibility on state taxes supply 
another source of potential evidence. Unfortunately, the literature as a 
whole offers murky results.194 Some authors find that deductibility 
increases state tax receipts,195 while others find that it affects only the form 
but not the amount of total state taxes.196 Further, because many of these 
deductibility studies do not account for the potentially confounding effects 
of other federal–state interactions, their results may not be fully reliable.197 
Existing studies may help to refine some of the causal mechanisms 
that might contribute to crowd-out or crowd-in, though. For example, by 
comparing Canadian provinces whose laws automatically tracked national 
tax rules with those that did not, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé found some 
modest evidence that Quebec, which did not track national law, was less 
sensitive to national tax rates than other provinces.198 That tends to support 
the idea that shared definitions are important to crowding. Similarly, Ladd 
found that the extensive federal tax reforms of 1986, in which the federal 
government eliminated many existing loopholes, boosted state budgets.199 
Chernick and Tennant’s findings about the shifting distribution of state tax 
bases lend some support to the hypothesis that income effects of federal 
taxation may vary by income level. And Agrawal finds that municipalities 
respond more strongly to state taxes than states do to federal taxes, which 
he interprets as evidence that the elasticity of the tax base is important to 
crowding effects.200 
At this point it should be obvious that even taken all together, the 
literature does not appear to offer clear predictions about crowd-out. 
Changes in tax rates or revenues for one tax instrument do not tell us what 
is happening at the same time to other state revenues or state borrowing. 
The effects of one influence, such as deductibility or base overlap, do not 
show us the combined impact of all federal influences. More evidence is 
needed. 
V. ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CROWDING 
In order to test the competing crowd-out and crowd-in hypotheses, I 
construct a dataset of U.S. state and federal budgets and other control 
 
194 Kaplow, supra note 21. 
195 Holtz-Eakin & Rosen, supra note 20; Metcalf, supra note 20; see also Galle & Klick, supra 
note 139, at 217 (finding that deductibility affects state countercyclical spending); Gramlich, supra note 
20, at 453–58 (reporting that deductibility increases demand for state and local public goods). 
196 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515–20; Courant & Gramlich, supra note 20, at 244–53. 
197 Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, US, supra note 18, at 252 n.5. 
198 Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, Canada, supra note 18, at 241, 252. 
199 Ladd, supra note 167. 
200 David R. Agrawal, Inter-federation Competition: Sales Taxation with Multiple Federations 27 
(Aug. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~dagrawal/
research_files/Agrawal_IFC.pdf. 
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variables, covering the years 1998 to 2010. I build a panel by collecting 
yearly information at the state level; that is, for each year, I have forty-eight 
observations, one representing each state.201 I then use regression analysis 
to identify statistical correlations between state and federal budgets, 
holding constant other factors that might influence the two. 
A. Methodology 
The regression analyses I report here take the form of what are known 
as fixed-effects panel regressions.202 In essence, what this means is that I 
will attempt to use the variation within each state from year to year to 
explain what causes state budgets to grow or shrink. Over time, the forces 
affecting each state budget, such as the size of federal revenues, the state’s 
wealth and population, and the amount of state taxes residents claim as 
deductions on their federal returns, will change. Other aspects of the state, 
such as its constitution, political tradition, and important budget 
institutions, are assumed to be unchanging, and so are held constant—
hence the term “fixed effects” regression.203 
As I discussed in Part III, the ideal measure of federal–state influence 
would be to observe what happens to state revenues as federal revenues 
change, holding constant any non-tax-related changes in the economy, but 
in the real world we cannot tell which economic changes are caused by 
taxes. Therefore I approximate the ideal measure by using two different 
dependent variables,204 state revenues as a portion of state GDP and per 
capita state own-source revenues. State revenues as a percentage of GDP 
could be underinclusive, in that it largely ignores deadweight loss or 
economic expansion caused by federal taxes. Per capita state revenues 
alone may be overinclusive: it will reflect economic conditions with only 
attenuated relations to federal tax. So by using both, I hope to bracket the 
correct answer. Reassuringly, my results are essentially identical under 
either approach. 
I measure federal tax burdens using a combination of federal revenues 
collected in each state, and the revenues collected in geographically 
adjacent states.205 In the absence of any identifiable shock that affects 
 
201 Because some of my key variables depend on geographically adjacent states, I omit Alaska and 
Hawaii. 
202 I describe additional technical details about the construction and analysis of the data, including 
a wide variety of alternative “specifications,” or research designs, in a related paper. Brian Galle, The 
Effect of National Revenues on Sub-national Revenues: Evidence from the U.S., 37 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 147, 150–54 (2014). 
203 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 222–23 
(2009). 
204 The “dependent” variable is typically the outcome whose influences we are hoping to measure. 
205 Although in theory I would like to observe the influence of all national revenues on each state’s 
budget, this is impractical statistically. Since federal revenues of course do not vary across states for 
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federal revenues without also directly impacting state budgets, my main 
source of identification will come from variations in federal effective rates, 
base definitions, and collection efforts, which in turn may vary with the 
composition of state populations and over time. Federal revenues collected 
in theory represents a composite of local economic conditions, federal rules 
applicable to taxpayers in those conditions, and federal officials’ effort at 
ensuring compliance with the rules. By controlling for economic 
conditions, I should be able to abstract away from the fine-grained and 
often-unobservable variations in federal rules and effort and measure their 
intermediate result, federal revenue collected.206 
Relying on federal revenues collected in each state creates some 
difficulties. IRS statistics on state-by-state collections do not fit perfectly 
with what in theory I want to test. The IRS collects the locus of the legal 
incidence of each tax, while the economic incidence may fall elsewhere.207 
Still, to the extent that taxpayers’ political responses are motivated in 
significant part by the legal incidence of a tax,208 the legal incidence may be 
an important determinant of crowding. In addition, to capture the possible 
in-state economic incidence of taxes imposed in neighboring states, I 
include population-weighted mean per capita tax burdens in geographically 
adjacent states.209 
As I also mentioned in Part III, I want to rule out the possibility that 
simultaneous changes in demand for public goods could be driving both 
 
any given year, there is no practical way to fully distinguish the impact of nationwide federal revenues 
from other potential influences, such as national economic conditions. 
Because some state taxes are federally deductible, state tax levels can affect federal revenues, a 
potential endogeneity problem. To the extent this is true, however, it should tend to produce a negative 
relationship between state taxes and federal taxes: when states collect more money, federal collections 
are reduced. If I observed a negative relationship between federal and state revenues, I would be unable 
to rule out the possibility that it is caused by this fiscal relationship. Instead, as I describe momentarily, 
I observe a positive relationship. That I am able to identify a positive relationship despite this negative 
feedback loop suggests that the true positive relationship might be even stronger than the one I measure. 
In a web appendix, I describe additional statistical steps I take to account for this feedback relationship. 
Brian Galle, Web Extension for: The Effect of National Revenues on Sub-national Revenues: Evidence 
from the U.S. (Apr. 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2210024. If anything, I find that crowd-in is even more pronounced than I 
report here. Id. at 4. 
206 Controlling for a variable essentially means that we approximate the impact of other variables, 
holding the controls constant. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 12–13 (7th ed. 2012). 
For instance, in this case we will simulate mathematically what the impact of varying in-state federal 
revenues would be if every state experienced the exact same economic conditions. 
207 IRS data on the state of origin for corporate taxes is based on the legal residence of the 
corporation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATABOOK 14 tbl.5 Notes (2011), which bears no real 
connection to its economic activities; my main results are robust to omitting federal corporate taxes 
from all variables. 
208 For a discussion of the laboratory evidence to that effect, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan 
Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
209 Results are robust to omitting population weights. 
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federal and state tax setting. Again, this story is fairly implausible in the 
period covered by the sample, given that health spending is the only major 
area of overlap. I therefore control for joint changes in demand for 
government by including Medicaid and non-Medicaid state health spending 
in the regression. 
In order to explain any observed crowding in or out, I also include a 
set of explanatory variables relating to the theories set out earlier. To test 
the impact of federal deductibility, I include the value of state and local tax 
(SALT) deductions claimed by taxpayers at varying income levels.210 I 
check for income effects using federal direct grants and federal spending 
(less grants) in each state–year. I set out the results of those additional tests, 
and analyze their implications for the usefulness of the deduction for state 
and local taxes, in a separate paper.211 
I additionally include a group of control variables that is mostly 
standard in the literature. Following prior work, I control for state 
population; population squared; fraction of population under 26 and over 
64; state median income, GDP, and unemployment rate; and state ideology. 
I measure economic conditions using population-weighted mean GDP per 
capita in adjacent states, as well as year effects. In some specifications (not 
reported), I also account for possible idiosyncratic state trends using unit-
specific year effects.212 To rule out the possibility that any observed crowd-
in results are the effect of an important federal matching grant for 
Medicaid, I control for each state’s match rate (FMAP) and the interaction 
between match rate and state Medicaid expenditures. 
Finally, it is unclear in theory whether we should expect state reactions 
to outside influences to be immediate, to entail some delay, or both. Some 
 
210 Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 226–36, find that the impact of SALT deductions varies by 
income level, with very-high-income taxpayers having a disproportionate impact on state spending. 
Because the reported SALT data are net of any AMT effects, I should not need to separately account for 
AMT. To be cautious, however, I include AMT in some regressions; my results are robust to inclusion 
or exclusion of the number of AMT payers in each income class. 
Endogeneity is also a potential problem for the SALT deduction regressors. As Metcalf notes, 
shocks to state wealth could simultaneously affect an individual’s state and federal tax liability. 
Metcalf, supra note 20, at 578. The former would reduce (increase) state revenues, while the latter 
could diminish (enhance) the value of the federal deduction. I therefore adapt Metcalf’s method to 
construct my own instruments for SALT value and use 2SLS to double-check the OLS results. First, I 
divide the population into groupings, by “AGI,” a tax law measure of income before itemized 
deductions. Then, for each grouping, I calculate the national average likelihood of itemizing and the 
marginal tax rate at the midpoint of each range. Following Metcalf’s formula, I use these figures to 
compute an average national “tax price” for each grouping: the amount of pennies that, on average, a 
person in that group would save from a one-dollar tax deduction. Because these figures are computed 
from national averages, individual state conditions have little effect on them. But, since tax price 
determines the dollar value of a SALT deduction, they are strongly correlated with the value of SALT 
deductions for each state and income group. Because the equation is exactly identified I do not test for 
weak instruments. 
211 Galle, supra note 202, at 152–54. 
212 For the most part my results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of unit-specific year effects. 
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prior literature includes “lags” of major variables—that is, they examine 
whether past years’ data affect a current year’s dependent variable.213 I 
therefore included lags of the economic and tax variables in each 
regression, and then, if these lags had no statistically significant results, 
reran the regression without them. Inclusion of lags did not change the sign 
of the main regressors of interest and did not alter the coefficients much, so 
the regressions reported here omit the lags. 
B. Results and Analysis 
The main results of the fixed-effects regressions are summarized in 
Table 1, below. The reported coefficient can be read as the percentage 
change in state own-source revenues resulting from a 1% increase in each 
logged regressor, or from a one-unit change in others.214 Column 1 
summarizes a regression using state revenues per capita as the dependent 
variable, while column 2 reports the same regression using state revenues 
as a fraction of state GDP. 
  
 
213 See, e.g., Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 253, 255. 
214 Although in some cases results were estimated more precisely in levels, I report results for 
revenue and economic variables as log–log both for ease of interpretation and because of the skewness 
of most per-state measures. 
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TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF PER CAPITA FEDERAL TAX  
COLLECTED IN STATE ON STATE REVENUES, 1998–2010 
 (1) (2) 
Variables State Revs.  
per Capita 
State Revs.  
per GDP 
   
Log pc fed. revs. in state 0.355*** 0.355*** 
 (6.089) (6.089) 
   
Log fed. taxes pc in adj. states  0.00678 0.00678 
 (0.358) (0.358) 
   
Log fed. non-grant expend in state pc  0.338*** 0.338*** 
 (4.363) (4.363) 
   
State unemployment -0.0231*** -0.0231*** 
 (-3.456) (-3.456) 
   
State median income in 2005 dollars 3.77e-06* 3.77e-06* 
 (1.860) (1.860) 
   
FMAP -0.0139*** -0.0139*** 
 (-2.892) (-2.892) 
   
R-squared 0.928 0.946 
   
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with year effects; regression includes state health 
spending, logged federal grants, population under 26, and population over 64 
(insignificant coefficients), and population, population square, logged values of state GDP 
per capita, weighted adjacent-state GDP, and per capita SALT deductions by AGI 
category (significant in some specifications); robust standard errors clustered by state; 
coefficient reported with (t score); all dollar figures reported in 2005 dollars; N = 575; 
*: statistically significant at a 5% level; **: statistically significant at a 1% level; 
***: statistically significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
In both of these regressions, as well as in a variety of other 
specifications I employ as double checks, there is highly statistically 
significant evidence that federal revenues crowd-in state revenues to a 
considerable degree. For example, as Table 1 reports, I find a measured 
elasticity of state revenue to federal revenues of 0.355. That is, when 
federal revenues rise by 1%, holding constant annual economic effects and 
local and regional economic factors, state revenues rise by 0.355%. 
Regressions using in-state federal revenues collected as a fraction of state 
GDP in place of per capita federal revenues collected in state similarly 
produce an elasticity of about 0.34.215 
 
215 Lags of federal revenues were insignificant in all these regressions, although in some cases 
there was a modest positive coefficient for state-own source revenues, significant at the 10% level—
95% confidence intervals generally ran from -0.001 to 0.03. Consequently I report results from 
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It is also worth noting that the control variables have impacts familiar 
from the literature. For example, states with a larger school-age population 
tend to raise more money. Likewise, state tax revenues increase with state 
wealth and decrease with unemployment. State revenue per GDP declines 
with GDP, likely because there is some delay in state adjustments to 
changed circumstances, and because states smooth revenues to some 
degree. Federal grants typically crowd-in state spending, and a more robust 
neighboring economy boosts each state’s revenues. 
As additional robustness checks, I estimate each equation using logged 
state expenditures per capita as the dependent variable, and separately 
using first differences of the revenue variables. Results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported. 
An important caveat to my findings is that I am able to study only a 
small segment of U.S. fiscal history. The theory I have sketched suggests 
crowding may be sensitive to institutional design and voter behavior, both 
of which can change over time. Still, the slice of time I have studied is the 
slice closest to today, and spans an entire business cycle. If courts are 
interested in how their decisions impact policy, these data are the most 
relevant to Spending Clause decisions in the near future. 
One other concern about the limited time span I study is that it 
happens to have been a period of unusually low federal marginal income 
tax rates. Nonetheless, federal revenues as a portion of GDP range from 
their postwar high of 20.6% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2009 and 2010, 
representing the lowest levels since 1950. Most years fall in the postwar 
average range of 17% to 18%. The sample therefore arguably captures a 
fairly representative set of federal taxing conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that a key premise of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Medicaid decision rests on uncertain, perhaps even incorrect, facts. I do not 
mean to say that my empirical findings can or should end the debate over 
conditional spending. The proper roles of national and state governments in 
our constitutional system will remain an enduring controversy.216 At most 
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my contribution here can help to move us past the overly reductive focus 
on coercion and toward that larger debate, as well as providing a reminder 
of the occasional importance of facts in public law.217 
Canadian and Australian legal scholars can make similar use of my 
findings. In both countries, there is a similar dispute over judicial control of 
conditional federal spending.218 Those disputes, too, are often tangled in the 
notion that grants coerce states.219 While cultural and institutional details of 
course will differ, my work here suggests that similar empirical 
investigation would help advance the discussion. 
Finally, whatever their use for lawyers, my findings here should be of 
independent interest to social scientists who study the fiscal relationship 
between governments. Though the effects of federal revenue measures on 
state finances have been a continuing topic of debate, the focus has until 
now fallen on narrow, individual tax measures. My evidence helps to tilt 
that discussion toward larger questions, such as whether a robust federal 
government is consistent with a vibrant set of state enterprises. My hope is 
that future work by myself and others will shed further light on which 
institutional factors are central in preventing national efforts from crowding 
out state rivals. 
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